Recently, no-poaching clauses in franchise agreements, which restrict mobility of workers across establishments within franchises, have attracted widespread attention from the press, state Attorneys General and private litigations. The concern is that no-poaching clauses may increase market power of employers by increasing the share of jobs in the market that employers control.
I. Introduction
There has been significant recent interest in no-poaching clauses in the press, 2 the courts 3 and among enforcement agencies particularly in the franchised fast food industry. 4 These no-poaching clauses restrict an owner of a franchise ("franchisee") from hiring employees from another franchisee within the same franchise brand, without restriction against hiring across franchise brands. Franchise owners may have an incentive to hire experienced/trained employees from other franchise locations, rather than train them, because the franchise restaurants are independently owned and have an incentive to maximize their own profit. 5 Therefore, a potential benefit of no-poaching clauses is the increased incentive they provide employers to employ unskilled/inexperienced workers whose productivity improves with experience and/or to invest in employee training and other forms of human capital, particularly if it is franchisespecific human capital. Weighing against this potential benefit are the anticompetitive effects caused by concentrating the control of jobs within the franchise brand, thereby reducing employee bargaining power. C.), July 9, 2018, describing State Attorneys General in 10 states and the District of Columbia that were investigating no-poaching clauses. 5 In most branded franchises, a franchisee is permitted to own more than one franchise location within the brand. For the purposes of this paper, following Krueger and Ashenfelter, we assume that each franchise location is owned by a different owner. The theoretical results in this paper do not depend on a limitation on the number of locations a franchise owner owns. The empirical concentration measures will be altered by the number of locations a single franchisee owns. A no-poaching clause will not cause further concentration among restaurants owned by the single owner.
There has been little empirical research examining the effects of no-poaching clauses on workers, or even the market concentration they cause. The only paper that focuses on the effects of no-poaching clauses within franchises agreements is the recent working/discussion paper by Kruger and 2018, hereafter "K&A") . 8 Although the paper remains unpublished working/discussion paper, it is cited by journalists, State Attorneys General and private litigants as the empirical support that no-poaching clauses reduce workers wages by significantly concentrating control of employment positions in the hands of owners of franchises. 9 Due to this broad citation and reliance on K&A that may have important effects on labor and employers K&A requires serious economic evaluation.
K&A does not measure the effect of no-poaching agreements directly but rather uses a standard
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 10 ("HHI") to measure the extent of concentration in labor markets for a subset of the fast food industry, known in the industry as quick service restaurants ("QSR"), in Rhode Island.
K&A claim, on theoretical grounds, that under a no-poaching clause "Franchisees are not permitted to hire from each other, which is equivalent to making the group of franchisees belonging to a chain a single employer in this labor market." 11 The first part of the statement in K&A is a correct; franchisees typically http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_ posner_pp.pdf. 7 In addition some restrictions on labor mobility may be viewed as abhorrent even if voluntary and potentially beneficial to workers. With no-poaching clauses, as viewed in K&A, the market concentration changes because employees working at a branded franchise no longer can seek work at other restaurants within the franchise brand 16 There is no intention to depict geographic placement in Figure 1 . franchise restaurants, the no-poaching clause will change the HHI for their employee from 38.3 to 40.06. This is a smaller change than at the green franchise because the yellow franchise brand has a smaller number of restaurants, and therefore the no-poaching clause has less impact on the change in the concentration in the market that the employees at the restaurants in the yellow franchise face. The nopoaching clause will have a different effect on the labor market opportunities for the employees of each franchise brand. There is no overall market concentration relevant across these different groups of workers because each group has distinctly different employment opportunities within the same product and geographic market. Instead, we need a different measure of concentration for the employees of each group of employees. The relevant index is no longer a market-wide HHI, but rather a labor groupspecific ("LI") set of indexes as shown in Table 1 for this set of employees or laborers at the 261 restaurants with no-poach clauses. Source: Hypothetical data based on 261 restaurants in 6 franchise brands.
However, K&A view the effect of no-poaching clauses in a different way. K&A assume that the nopoaching clauses "make a franchise brand into single employer," not only for the employees working in the franchise brand, but also for workers at other franchise brands, preventing workers from any franchise from negotiating with all but one negotiator at each of the other franchise bands. The effect of such an assumption is depicted in Figure 3 , where each of the franchise brands changes from multiple restaurant employment opportunities to a single potential employer controlling multiple jobs.
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In Figure 3 , no-poaching clauses at the six hypothetical branded franchises prevent all employees, not only from negotiating with multiple other restaurants within the same franchise brand, but also from negotiating with all but one representative at all other franchise brands, effectively a representative that controls all the jobs within that franchise. As Figure 3 shows, in the conception of the employment market under no-poaching agreements in K&A employees at the green franchise now face only six total possible employers. Therefore, instead of 87 restaurant in the red franchises, employees at all of the other franchise brands can only approach one potential employer in the red franchise, and similarly for each of the other branded franchises in Figure 3 . Under this view of how no-poaching clauses function, the HHI moves from 38.3 without no-poaching clauses to 2388.0 for all employees in the branded franchise market with no-poaching clauses. There is no evidence that no-poaching clauses under discussion by K&A and in the public arena have the feature of making all franchisees in a brand into functionally a single employer as K&A imparts to them.
Nonetheless, as we will show in the section IV of this paper, this is how the calculations related to nopoaching clauses are analyzed in K&A.
III. Why the Standard HHI Does Not Reflect Relevant Impact of No-Poaching Clauses: Theoretical Link Between Competition and Concentration Ratios
K&A reference the Cournot model as the theoretical justification for using the HHI as an indicator of potential market power. 20 The Cournot model shows that as the number of employers in a market falls, causing the number of employees available to each employer to increase, employers will reduce wages.
20 Robert E. Dansby and Robert D. Willig, "Industry Performance Gradient Indexes," American Economic Review, Vol. 69, 1979, PP. 249-260 . The authors (P. 249) caution that how a firm responds to competitors' decisions can be an important consideration: "Since different modes of firms' conduct lead to different indexes, the choice among concentration index formulae should be based on an assessment of the behavior of the industry's firms. We find that the potential improvement in welfare performance is as sensitive to mode of conduct and other industry data as it is to market shares." Krueger and Ashenfelter offered no such assessment.
K&A assert that the no-poaching clauses make the franchisees of a brand into a single employer in the labor market for all employees, regardless which franchise brand they work for. 21 K&A then used this asserted effect of the no-poaching agreements to determine the HHI that would exist in the market.
However, K&A do not use the Cournot model to demonstrate that the no-poaching clauses would cause otherwise independent franchisees within a franchise brand to function as a single firm. They simply use the Cournot model as a justification for using the HHI as a measure of market power. The assertion that no-poaching agreements make all franchise owners within a brand into functionally a single employer is purely an assertion of K&A.
Even without a direct justification from a theoretical model, the HHI is sometimes used as a potential ancillary measure of market power. The DoJ/FTC has used the HHI as an indicator of markets that may require additional review of mergers that may create market power through concentrations of markets.
Other scholarly research investigates the relationship between the HHI and market power without explicitly determining whether the market being analyzed is consistent with a Cournot model. 1) Supply; W(N) = a +bN = a+ b(n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 ), which is market labor supply curve as a function of N, b is the market response of the wage W(n) to the number of employees in the labor market.
N is the total number of employees in the market, including n 1 + n 2 , which are in franchise brand I, plus n 3 + n 4 which are in franchise brand J i . The jobs for the employees are identical. The individual employees have different reservations wages, which creates the upward sloping market supply curve, but are otherwise identical.
2) Demand: S'(N) =D, which is constant price of outputs.
A common version of this model used for heuristic purposes is to assume that all firms (in this case franchisee restaurants) have the same S'(N), which means all firms in the market end up with the same quantity of workers.
The no-poaching clauses mean that for each wage an individual employer (e.g. , employer 1 in franchise brand I (denoted as "I-1")) cannot attract n/4n of the employees he/she would normally hire because the restaurant cannot hire from restaurant 2 in franchise brand I. The same limitation is symmetrically true for each of the other restaurant locations, whether in franchise brand J or I. However, the restaurants in franchise brand I can hire from the two locations in J, which also cannot hire from each other. Therefore, while restaurant I-1 loses the opportunity to hire n/4n of the employees that would be available in the market from I-2 inside the franchise brand, restaurant I-1 also shares with I-2 the increased opportunity of hiring the employees from J-1 and J-2 who cannot move between the J branded franchises. There are 2n of these employees who are now only available to the I franchise brand coming from the J franchise brand In general, a dynamic process like poaching/no-poaching is unlikely to be captured in an inherently nondynamic model such as a Cournot model. In a Cournot model, where there is no friction, and where movement between companies, if any, is driven by employer demand rather than laborer decisions about work location preferences, it is not clear there is ever any poaching. Therefore any implication that nopoaching clauses cause an increase in market power through a Cournot model may be out of reach.
In other models, not just Cournot, where employees are restricted from seeking employment within their franchise brand, there is an increased opportunity for those same employees to be hired by restaurants 24 With B symmetric franchise brands with r restaurants in each brand, the supply curve in the 2 franchise brand example is generalized to: Supply: W(N) = a + b[N(1 + ], where B is the number of franchise brands and r is the number of restaurants per brand. For example, as described below, in Rhode Island, there are about 260 restaurants within 20 franchise brands. If these brands were equally-sized, there would be 13 restaurants per brand. This would reduce the number of opportunities represented in the supply curve by about 4 percent ((13 -2)/(20 x 13)).
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outside the franchise brand that may not hire from within their franchise brand. The no-poaching clause reduces the number of potential employers for each employee, but at the same time increases those same employers demand for employees from outside the franchise brand. The demand curve remains the same, and the supply curve is altered relatively little, if at all.
In dynamic labor models, employee termination rates may influence the market power of employers. 25 To the extent that the quit rates are due to the process of retirement from the industry or movement to other franchise brands, no-poaching clauses will likely have little to no impact on the exit, termination rates or hire rates at an employer, again because any restriction in hiring within the franchise is offset by the increase in the supply of workers available from restaurants at other franchise brands who may not hire their own workers. To the extent that restaurants within a brand have a preference for hiring workers from restaurants from their own branded franchise, the exit and rehire rates could decline due to nopoaching clauses. At the same time, the preference for hiring workers from restaurants within the franchise brand means that there has been some sort of franchise-specific experience, on-the-job training and/or human capital acquisition that make these employees more valuable within the franchise brand.
26
This franchise-specific investment in human capital is in great part the justification for implementing nopoaching clauses to promote more on-the-job training and human capital investment. Without an elevated exit rate and rehire rate associated with the desire to hire from within the franchise brand, the no-poaching clause likely has little to no effect on exit and hire rates because the employees' reduced opportunity to be hired at a restaurant within the franchise brand is counterbalanced by the increased opportunities outside the franchise brand. Concomitantly, the employers' loss of potential hires within the franchise brand is 25 For a description of dynamic labor models where employee exit rates are related to employer market power see reducing the rate at which employees leave their jobs, no-poaching agreements lower wages, as we discuss below, such agreements may well have no effect on quit rates. 26 To the extent that training at quick service restaurants ("QSRs") is industry-specific it will induce employers to prefer workers from within their brand.
counterbalanced by the increased opportunity to hire employees of competing franchise brands who may not be hired by employers of those brands.
This does not mean that some mechanism like no-poaching clauses can't impact competition or that the HHI may not provide a useful empirical metric to study market concentration from no-poaching clauses.
It simply means that at least some common forms of the Cournot model and some dynamic models cited by K&A do not imply that no-poaching clauses make franchisees within a brand function as a single company. It also means that these models do not suggest that no-poaching clauses necessarily have large impacts on employee wages, absent firm-specific human capital acquisition. 
IV. Performance of Concentration Measures, LI compared to HHI: Empirical Example from Quick Service Restaurants in Rhode Island

A. Effect of No-Poaching Clause Based on the Extent of Market Competition in QSR in Rhode Island
We can implement a correction to the HHI in K&A by accurately reflecting the number of competing employers that employees see in the market as described above. To perform this corrected calculation, we collected the number of restaurant locations for each of the franchise brands in K&A that they defined as QSRs. We obtained the restaurant counts from the Rhode Island Department of Health as "Active" QSRs.
34
Using FRANdata's Franchise Registry, we determined which of the restaurant chains in the Appendix Table 2 lists the number of locations in Rhode Island for each branded QSR franchise from the list we generated and whether the Appendix employees of branded QSR franchises that do not have no-poaching clauses, the no-poaching clauses have no impact on the number of employers that compete for those potential employees' services: the market concentration they face is unchanged. Based on the K&A data, the H* = 38.3 for QRS workers in Rhode Island. Based on our data and calculation method the H* = 38.17, absent no-poaching clauses.
38 Table 3 lists the branded QSR franchise, whether the brand's franchise agreement has a no-poach clause according to FRANdata, the number of locations in Rhode Island for the franchise brand (these fields also included in Table 2 ), and our new measure of the laborer group-specific index of concentration ("LI" defined above) with no-poaching agreements prohibited, and the LI given the current state of no-poaching clauses for each franchise brand. 38 As described earlier, the K&A calculation of an H* of 1,678 assumes (incorrectly) that all chains have no-poach agreements that reduce employment opportunities across locations of all brands. Our data produces an H* of 1,385 with the assumptions in K&A (2017, 2018) . values for all of the chains. If there were 4 chains, with LI values of 500, 500, 1000, and 1000, the LTI would be (500 + 500 + 1000 + 1000) / 4 = 750. 48 The Laborer Total Weighted Index (LTI-Weighted) is a weighted average of the Laborer-Specific Concentration Index (LI) values for all of the chains, weighted by the number of locations. Each LI value is multiplied by the number of locations for that particular chain, the results are summed, and then divided by the total number of locations. If there were 4 chains, with LI values of 500, 500, 1000, and 1000, and they had 1, 2, 3, and 4 locations respectively, the LTI-Weighted would be ((500 * 1) + (500 * 2) + (1000 * 3) + (1000 * 4) / (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) = 850. In this case, the LTI-Weighted is larger than the LTI, because there are more locations, and therefore more workers at those locations, who experience a more concentrated market. 49 These same measures of concentration could be performed incorporating the number of individual workers at each location.
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B. With Minimal Market Concentration, there is No Evidence of Competitive Harm from No-Poaching Clauses
Having calculated market concentration to reflect the employer conditions that Rhode Island QSR employees face, based on the data we described earlier, there is no evidence that no-poaching clauses in Rhode Island significantly alter market concentration or market power as measured in K&A. The increase in market concentration that K&A say reflects "potentially large impact of no-poaching clauses on the competitiveness of this labor market" 50 is the result of a calculation that does not reflect how no- 
V. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that in assessing the effect of no-poaching clauses on different labor groups composed of employees of different franchises, a new approach is needed to measure concentration. The new measure described here determines market concentration based on the employment opportunities available to employees of each branded franchise, because each of the labor groups have very different opportunities under the limitations imposed by no-poaching clauses. The new set of laborer group-specific indexes of concentration is needed to describe a market where different groups of laborers face different effective market concentrations, which makes the market-wide HHI irrelevant because it cannot describe the extent of, or change in, concentration for the market overall, or for any individual labor group. The empirical analysis in this paper shows that the HHI can differ greatly from the relevant measure of the LI. The empirical example shows that the HHI calculated for the quick service restaurant market in Rhode Island as presented in K&A is greatly inflated because it relies on a misconception of the limitations that no-poaching clauses place on workers. The laborer group-specific index ("LI") developed in this paper shows that based on the data we analyzed the additional job concentration and potential employer market power created by no-poaching clauses in the RI QSR industry as defined by K&A is minimal. Other markets or definitions of markets may exhibit different results.
The LI is applicable to other markets besides labor markets under no-poaching clauses. Any market where the location of the good or service restricts or enhances which companies can purchase the product will require individual group-specific concentration indexes. For example, market allocation models or market allocation models with some overlapping boundaries will require sets of group-specific indexes to describe the effect of the market allocations. In addition, any regulation that segments the allowable goods or services that can be purchased by certain companies requires a set of group-specific indexes to measure concentration accurately and to determine whether there is some competitive impact within any individual group based on the regulation. In addition, any merger that occurs within a market that has such segmentation also needs to use a set of group-specific indexes to determine effects on specific groups. In this analysis the accurate use of measures of concentration revealed that across the labor groups, the effect of no-poaching clauses, although different across labor groups, was low for all groups, reflecting little influence of no-poaching clauses on employees' market position and ability to achieve higher wages, due to market concentration.
However, no-poaching clauses could have an important influence on labor well-being for other reasons.
It may be that labor, even low-skill labor, is not very fungible across franchise brands. Employees may 11/11/2018 learn certain skills that make them additionally valuable due to on-the-job experience that is specific to a franchise brand. 51 Preventing an employee from moving to another restaurant within a franchise brand may limit the employee from taking advantage of these acquired brand-specific skills. Measurement of this type of limitation is not captured by the concentration measures proposed by K&A or in this paper.
At the same time, limitations on employee movement between restaurants within a brand may provide the franchisee greater incentive to hire inexperienced workers whose productivity will rise with time on the job and/or train employees because competing franchisees of the same brand will be prohibited from expropriating that investment. The literature on Human Capital makes it clear that even low-level employees receive significant on-the-job experience/training. Furthermore, it is clear that over time at some quick service restaurants' employees receive explicit training and education. 52 While the oft cited empirical work in K&A,actually reflects at most a minimal increase in effective concentration in the QSR industry in RI, the limitation of employees' use of their franchise-specific human capital could be significant and remains unaddressed empirically in the QSR industry. In addition, there has been no empirical analysis of the effect of no-poaching clauses on employer investment in employee human capital. Furthermore, there has been no direct effect of no-poaching clauses on employee pay.
In addition, it is possible that more refined analysis of geographic markets will show that in some locations no-poaching clauses could have an important effect on laborers. These studies would need to include relevant geographic markets, which would not be limited by administrative boundaries (i.e.
states), but rather would be defined by relevant employment markets and forces. 
